In-Groups Defend Their Turf? Philosophy versus Psychology in the New York Times

A showdown of sorts with Jonathan Haidt is brewing on The Stone.

Michael P. Lynch gives us “A Vote for Reason.”

The judgment that reasons play no role in judgment is itself a judgment. And Haidt has defended it with reasons. So if those reasons convince me that his theory is true, then reasons can play a role in judgment — contra the theory. Think about the passage I quoted above in this context: those who love truth need to take a good, hard look at the evidence and see reasoning for what it is. This sounds like a self-defeating argument: we are being advised to use reason to see that reason is flawed.

Gary Gutting adds “Haidt’s Problem with Plato.”

Plato’s intuitions derive from a long and complex process of physical, emotional and intellectual formation in a supportive social system.  (This is what Plato means by the “education” of his philosopher-rulers.) These intuitions are what — given sufficient experience, maturity and, especially, responsible intellectual engagement with others — we hope will replace the snap-judgment intuitions Haidt rightly sees as underlying so much of our moral life.

Haidt is scheduled to respond this Sunday evening. (My own previous challenge to Haidt has gone unanswered.)

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