Man AND Rabbit: Naturalizing the Ethics of Belief
We need trust to know–even if we’ll also be misled into error by that trust.
Epistemic Reliability
Against Deference: Epistemic Privilege Considered
Following up on my claim in the last post that “honor produces error,” in my view, the problem is epistemic privilege, i.e. deference. By deference, I mean the epistemic privileges that some people receive or earn through demonstrating their erudition or looking like they know what they’re talking about. When you think of deference, you…
Beyond Utopophobia
The newest issue of The Good Society has been released, with a symposium my friend Steven Maloney and I put together on epistemic proceduralism. It features contributions by James Bohman , Corey Brettschneider , Noëlle McAfee , and Robert Talisse and Michael Harbour . The ‘utopophobia’ in the title comes from David Estlund’s book Democratic…