Personal identity intuitions

Most philosophers start with the big theories: psychological continuity, embodied persistence, “no further fact” anticriterialism. Yet in a vaguely Parfitian way, I’ve been wondering whether our identity intuitions can or should be forced to line up under a particular theory. So let’s look at some of the intuition pumps and see if they ought, in… Continue reading Personal identity intuitions

Verifying Moral Realism (The Will-be/Ought Gap, continued)

Yesterday, I called myself a moral realist, which is to say that I believe that some claims about values are agent-neutral. Going back to testability, I suspect that one place that markets will not yield much benefit is in evaluations of normativity. Despite the fact that I am a moral realist and believe that there… Continue reading Verifying Moral Realism (The Will-be/Ought Gap, continued)