Against Deference: Epistemic Privilege Considered

Following up on my claim in the last post that “honor produces error,” in my view, the problem is epistemic privilege, i.e. deference. By deference, I mean the epistemic privileges that some people receive or earn through demonstrating their erudition or looking like they know what they’re talking about. When you think of deference, you… Continue reading Against Deference: Epistemic Privilege Considered

Beyond Utopophobia

The newest issue of The Good Society has been released, with a symposium my friend Steven Maloney and I put together on epistemic proceduralism. It features contributions by James Bohman, Corey Brettschneider, Noëlle McAfee, and Robert Talisse and Michael Harbour.  The ‘utopophobia’ in the title comes from David Estlund’s book Democratic Authority, which invokes epistemic grounds… Continue reading Beyond Utopophobia